Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Religious Choice by Tigran Melkonyan & Mark Pingle
 
 
UNR Joint Economics Working Paper Series 
Working Paper No. 08-002 
 
 
Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Religious Choice 
 
 
Tigran Melkonyan and Mark Pingle 
 
 
Department of Economics /0030 
University of Nevada, Reno 
Reno, NV 89557-0207 
(775) 784-6850│ Fax (775) 784-4728 






Using a relatively mild restriction on the beliefs of the  MMEU − α preference functional, in 
which the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity and degree of pessimism are each 
parameterized, we present a rather general theory of religious choice in the decision theory 
tradition, one that can resolve dilemmas, address the many Gods objection, and address the 
inherent ambiguity. Using comparative static analysis, we are able to show how changes in either 
the degree of ambiguity or the degree of pessimism can lead a decision maker to “convert” from 
one religion to another. We illustrate the theory of religious choice using an example where the 
decision maker perceives three possible religious alternatives. 
 
JEL Classification: C44, D81, D83 
 




 Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Religious Choice 
 
Tigran Melkonyan 
Professor of Economics 






Professor of Economics 







Using a relatively mild restriction on the beliefs of the  MMEU − α preference 
functional, in which the decision maker’s degree of ambiguity and degree of 
pessimism are each parameterized, we present a rather general theory of religious 
choice in the decision theory tradition, one that can resolve dilemmas, address the 
many Gods objection, and address the inherent ambiguity. Using comparative 
static analysis, we are able to show how changes in either the degree of 
ambiguity or the degree of pessimism can lead a decision maker to “convert” 
from one religion to another. We illustrate the theory of religious choice using an 







  2 
“…I know …I must soon die, but what I know least is the very death I cannot escape.” 
  --- Blaise Pascal (1670 [1958], fragment 194) 
 
1.  Introduction 
  
Suffering from ill health most of his adult life, Blaise Pascal experienced what he said 
knew least on August 16, 1662 at age 39.   Exiting his short life, he left behind a legacy of 
significant contributions to math, science, and religious philosophy.   Today, a unit of pressure, a 
computer programming language, and a triangle of numbers bear his name.  Pascal shifted away 
from studying math and science, after a moving personal experience in 1654 led to his “second 
conversion.
1”  He was working on a comprehensive apology for the Christian faith, but died 
before completing it.  Pascal’s Pensées (Pascal, 1670 [1958]), a collection of Pascal’s thoughts 
on religion and philosophy, was published posthumously.   Among these thoughts, one finds an 
innovative application of logic to religious choice, thinking that has been labeled “the advent of 
decision theory” (Jorden, 1994a, p.3).      
It may not be incidental that thinking about life after death played a role in the 
development of decision theory.  What happens at the moment of death may be the quintessential 
example of uncertainty.  This uncertainty, like most, tends to make people anxious.  Adam Smith 
(1759 [2000], Part I, paragraph I.I.13) called the “dread of death” the “great poison to human 
happiness.”       
Religion can ameliorate the dread associated with death.  Religious precepts typically 
instruct people about life and the afterlife, and some of this teaching may reduce the uncertainty 
                                                 
1 Pascal’s “first conversion” was a 1646 commitment to Jansenism, a relatively Puritanical and relatively 
Augustinian practice of Roman Catholicism that conformed to the writings of Cornelius Jansen.  The “second 
conversion” is associated with an event reportedly occurring on November 23, 1654.  Pascal and some friends were 
riding in a carriage when the team of horses pulling it plunged off a bridge.  Because the reins broke, the carriage 
did not follow, but was left half on and half off the bridge.   Pascal apparently fainted out of a fear of the nearness of 
death, and was unconscious for some time.  Later, while recovering, Pascal had what he described as an intense 
religious vision.  The notes he immediately took down to remind himself of the vision, known as the Memorial, 
were inadvertently found by a servant after his death, sewn into Pascal’s coat.        
  3a person associates with death.  Pascal’s innovation was to recognize that, even if religious 
teaching does not eliminate uncertainty, a rational faith decision can still be made by considering 
the anticipated payoffs in various possible states.   
In its most simple form, Pascal’s “wager” can be interpreted as a choice between theism 
and atheism.  In Pascal’s words:  
God is or He is not.  But to which side will we incline?  ...  What 
will you wager?  … You must wager.  It is not optional … Let us 
weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is.   …  If you 
win, you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing.  Do not 
hesitate then; wager that he does exist. 
            --- Pascal  (1670 [1958], fragment 233)    
In these words, we see fundamental elements of modern decision theory.  The choice set is 
parsed into a set of mutually exclusive alternatives: “Wagering that God is” and “wagering that 
God is not.”  Uncertainty is recognized by positing mutually exclusive potential states: “God is” 
and “God is not.”    A payoff is associated with each alternative-state combination.  In this 
wager, the payoffs are not explicit, but Pascal implicitly assumes one decision alternative 
“weakly dominates” the other.  Thus, in this pioneering decision theory problem, the weak 
dominance concept was applied to offer one explanation for why it is rational for people to 
choose theism over atheism.   
Of course, the assumptions Pascal imbedded in his original wager can be modified, so 
that the decision theory must be extended in order to explain choice.   For example, McClennan 
(1994, p.118) remarks, “Many will simply reject the claim that, if God does not exist, you have 
lost nothing by betting on God.”  If payoffs are altered to suit this statement, the wager may 
  4become a dilemma the best choice depends upon the state that arises.  Because weak dominance 
does not hold in this case, it cannot be used to identify the rational choice. To predict the choice, 
decision theory must be extended to include a decision criterion that will resolve the dilemma.   
The “many Gods objection” is another significant critique of Pascal’s wager.    This is the 
recognition that, for many people, the set of religious alternatives contains more than two 
elements.
2  To address the many Gods objection, a decision theory must be applied that can 
accommodate more than two decision alternatives.  
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 1954) can resolve dilemmas and 
accommodate many alternatives, so we might try to use it to construct a more general theory of 
religious choice.  However, the inability to collect objective religious information makes the 
applicability of SEU theory questionable (Montgomery, 1996).  Death, according to Shakespeare 
(Hamlet, Act 3), is “the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveler returns.”   What 
happens after death may be so uncertain that a decision maker cannot construct a unique 
subjective probability distribution over alternative religious states, nor rationally update beliefs.  
The inability to construct a single probability distribution over the states is what 
distinguishes “ambiguity” from “risk.”    The distinction between risk and ambiguity dates to 
Knight (1921[1971]) and Keynes (1921).   However, models of choice under ambiguity have 
only recently been developed, largely to explain Ellsberg (1961) behavior, the finding that 
people respond to ambiguity in ways that contradict SEU theory.  Because such contradictions 
                                                 
2 See Jordan (1994b) for a discussion of the many Gods objection.  Hacking (1994) and Morris (1994) suggest 
Pascal did not intend for us to partition the set of choices into theism and atheism.  Rather, it is more accurate to say 
Pascal’s intent was to make the partition “pursuing God” with actions that will probably lead one to believe versus 
“not bothering about such things” (Hacking, 1994, p.25).    Similarly, Morris (1994, p56) contends Pascal’s intent 
was to use his wager to put the unbeliever on the path to belief in the Christian faith which Pascal had adopted.   
However, the many Gods objection remains as long as one admits the possibility that all do not find the same 
religion in the search.    
  5have repeatedly and routinely been found in the experimental and empirical literature, 
3 we have 
reason to expect that the SEU model may fail to explain religious choice and that a model of 
ambiguity may perform better. The most popular models capable of explaining Ellsberg-type 
behavior are Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet expected utility (CEU) model and Gilboa and 
Schmeidler's (1989) maximin expected utility (MMEU) model.   
The α - maximin expected-utility (α - MMEU) model (see, e.g., Cohen, 1992, Jaffray and 
Philippe, 1997, Ghirardato, Klibanoff and Marinacci, 1998, Ghirardato, Maccheroni and 
Marinacci, 2004, Siniscalchi, 2006, Ludwig and Zimper, 2006, Olszewski, 2008, Eichberger, 
Grant and Kelsey, 2008) utilized in this paper is a generalization of the MMEU model. The 
general nature of α - MMEU model makes it especially suitable for modeling religious choice.   
Beliefs are represented by a set of probability distributions.  The model reduces to the Savage 
(1954) SEU model when the set of distributions is a singleton, capturing a decision maker who 
happens to be able to construct a probability distribution over different religious states.  At the 
opposite extreme, it reduces to the Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) model of total ambiguity when the 
set of distributions becomes the probability simplex, capturing a decision maker who regards 
religious choice as being totally ambiguous.    Between these two extremes, the size of the set of 
probability distributions is a measure of the degree of ambiguity, or a measure of what Gajdos et 
al (2004) refer to as the degree of information imprecision.  
Religious alternatives in the α - MMEU model are evaluated using a convex combination 
of minimum and maximum expected utilities. The relative weight placed on the probability 
distribution that minimizes expected utility can be interpreted as a measure of ambiguity 
aversion or, following Arrow and Hurwicz (1972), a measure of pessimism. A totally ambiguity 
                                                 
3 Camerer and Weber (1992) and Camerer (1999) provide accessible introductions to the empirical literature on the 
Ellsberg Paradox. 
  6averse decision-maker, or a total pessimist, places all of the weight on the probability distribution 
that minimizes expected utility.  Alternatively, a totally ambiguity tolerant decision-maker, or a 
total optimist, places all of the weight on the probability distribution that maximizes expected 
utility.   Thus, the α - MMEU model has the advantage of having maximin expected utility and 
maximax expected utility as special cases. 
  Our contribution in this paper is twofold.  First, we derive a number of comparative 
static results for an  MMEU − α decision maker whose beliefs are given by the core of a simple 
capacity. Specifically, we examine how choice is affected as the degrees of ambiguity and 
pessimism interact in the  MMEU − α  model.  Second, we use this preference functional to 
present a rather general theory of religious choice in the decision theory tradition, one that can 
resolve dilemmas, address the many Gods objection, and address the ambiguity inherent in the 
choice.    Using straightforward comparative static analysis, we are able to show how changes in 
either the degree of ambiguity or the degree of pessimism can lead a decision maker to “convert” 
from one religion to another.    We illustrate our results using an example where the decision 




2.  Parameterizing Ambiguity in an  MMEU − α Model 
Assume a decision-maker DM must choose an action x from   mutually exclusive 
actions .  DM perceives the payoff provided by action 
N
} ,..., 2 , 1 { N X = x depends upon which 
stateθ  arises from among mutually exclusive states  N } ,..., 2 , 1 { N = Θ .  In particular, DM 
perceives the payoff  will be received when action x is chosen and state 
x uθ θ  occurs.  
  7To apply this framework as a model of religious choice, let the action be the choice to 
adopt religion  .   Assume DM is able to arrange his or her conceptions of different 
religions into   mutually exclusive alternatives.  Also, assume DM believes one and only one 
religion is true.  Uncertain as to which is true, DM perceives   possible states, where 
X x∈
N
N Θ ∈ θ  is 
the state “religion θ  is true.”   DM perceives the payoff   from adopting religion x under state 
x uθ
θ .   To have a specific example, suppose DM perceives three religious alternatives with the 
payoffs presented in Table 1.      
Table 1:  Illustrative Religious Decision Matrix for DM 
  Religion a True  Religion b True  Religion c True 
Religion a  10  -20  -20 
Religion b  -10  20  -10 
Religion c  -20  -10  30 
 
DM’s beliefs may be ambiguous, meaning the likelihoods of the different states in Θmay 
not be known with precision.  These beliefs are represented by the set of probability distributions 
P , where P  is a subset of the   dimensional probability simplex  . A generic 
element of 
N
N ] 1 , 0 [ ≡ Δ
P  is a probability distribution  ) ,...., , ( 2 1 N p p p p = , and one can think of P  as 
representing both information and confidence in that information.
4 If DM has no information 
that allows a winnowing of the set P , then there is total ambiguity, characterized by  Δ = P . DM 
only knows the probability of each state is between 0 and 1.  At the other extreme, DM has 
                                                 
4 Gajdos et al. (2004) provide a complementary interpretation of the set of probabilities. The decision-maker in their 
model maximizes the minimum expected utility computed with respect to a subset of the set of initially given priors. 
The extent to which the set of initially given priors is reduced is a measure of aversion to information imprecision. 
  8information and confidence in it which leads to the belief that only one distribution is valid.  The 
set   is a singleton, and DM faces pure risk.   P
DM has alpha maxi-min expected utility preferences,
5 abbreviated as  MMEU − α .  This 
implies the utility V(x) from action x is given by 
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When  MMEU − α is applied, the expected utility associated with a given action x is calculated 
for each admissible probability distribution P p∈ , with all resulting calculations being discarded 
except for the minimum and maximum.  The parameter  [ ] 1 , 0 = α  characterizes DM’s degree of 
pessimism, as in the Arrow-Hurwicz criterion.  This parameter determines the weight given to 
the minimum and maximum expected utilities provided by action x.  Finding utility V(x) for 
each action x in this manner, DM selects action x that maximizes V(x).  
When α = 1, α - MMEU preferences have the MMEU form. DM is totally pessimistic.  
One can say DM exhibits total ambiguity aversion in this case because the existence of multiple 
potentially applicable probability distributions is translated into the presumption that the least 
favorable distribution applies. In contrast,  0 = α  implies DM is totally ambiguity tolerant, 
presuming the most optimistic probability distribution applies. As α  increases from zero to one, 
DM changes from being ambiguity tolerant to being ambiguity intolerant. Although  MMEU − α  
is more general than the MMEU model, it shares some of its shortcomings. Specifically, 
MMEU − α  still ignores almost all of the information contained in the DM’s set of priors; 
preferences are completely characterized by the best and worst scenarios but nothing between 
these two possibilities. 
                                                 
5 Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) provide an axiomatic characterization of α - MMEU preferences. 
  9  Imposing the requirement that  is the core of a simple capacity allows a simple 
parameterization of the degree of ambiguity and, as will become clear below, places our model 
on a solid axiomatic ground. (See Appendix A for definitions of a capacity, a core of a capacity, 
and a supermodular capacity.)    Given  f ≡ (f({1}),...,f({N}))
P
∈ Δ and  [ 1 , 0 ] ∈ λ , a capacity v is 
simple if  {} () ( ) { } () θ λ θ f v − = 1  for all  Θ ∈ θ ,  ( ) 1 = Θ v , and vi 1,...,ik, {} () = vi j {} ( )
j=1
j=k
∑  when 
. The probability distribution   is called an anchor. A simple capacity is supermodular 
and 
N k < f
P = 1−λ () f {} + λΔ. That is, P  is the Minkowski sum of a singleton set  () {} f λ − 1  and the 
probability simplex   scaled by  Δ λ . These assumptions imply P  is a simplex with faces parallel 
to those of simplex  , and the variable  Δ λ  is naturally interpreted as a measure of the degree of 
ambiguity. In Bayesian statistics set   is called an  P ε-contaminated set of priors (Berger and 
Berliner, 1986).  
  Simple capacities constitute a special case of neo-additive capacities (Chateauneuf, 
Eichberger and Grant, 2007). Recently, Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007) have 
axiomatized CEU preferences with neo-additive capacity. It turns out that DM has CEU 
preferences with simple capacity   if and only if DM has  v MMEU − α  with beliefs given by the 
core of capacity   (Ludwig and Zimper, 2006, Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant, 2007). Thus, 
the preferences employed in this paper stem from the behavioral axioms employed  in 
Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007). Under these axioms the coefficient of pessimism 
v
α 
is constant over the space of all acts. This is in contrast to Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and 
Marinacci’s (2004) axiomatization of  MMEU − α  preferences where if one takes the set of 
probability distributions derived from their partial order of independent acts as DM’s beliefs then 
coefficient α  in general depends on the act over which the  MMEU − α  preference functional is 
evaluated (Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey, 2008). Since having a constant α considerably 
simplifies our comparative static analysis we have adopted belief structure represented by a 
simple capacity. Moreover, as stated in the following theorem (for a proof, see Ludwig and 
Zimper, 2006) the  MMEU − α  preference functional with respect to the core of a simple 
capacity has a very compact and easy-to-analyze form.  
 
  10Theorem 1 (Parameterizing Ambiguity):   Let  i θ  be defined by  { } N i ,..., 1 ∈ θ ,  j i θ θ ≠  for  j i ≠  
with  , and  { N j i ,..., 1 , ∈ }uθ1
x ≤ uθ 2
x ≤ ...≤ uθ N−1
x ≤ uθ N
x .
6  If P  is the core of simple capacity v, then 
(2)  V(x) = (1− λ) f θ1 {} () uθ1
x + f θ2 {} ( )uθ 2
x + ....+ f θN {} ( )uθ N
x {} + λ uθ N
x −α(uθ N
x − uθ1
x ) { }. 
 
Our parameter λ corresponds to Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant’s (2007) parameter 
δ while our parameter α corresponds to their  1−α ( ).   Theorem 1 indicates that, when the set of 
beliefs   is restricted to the core of a simple capacity, the  P α - MMEU utility level for an action 
is a convex combination of the utility obtained from applying the anchor probability distribution 
and the utility obtained when all probability distributions are admissible.  Because the variable 
λ  is the weight given to these two utility extremes, theorem 1 indicates it is a measure of the 
degree of ambiguity when preferences are α - MMEU.  
To illustrate the applicability of Theorem 1 to our model of religious choice, consider 
three special cases: (1)  0 = λ ; (2)  1 = λ ,  1 = α ; and  (3)  1 = λ ,  0 = α .   For case 1, there is no 
ambiguity, the anchor probability distribution applies, the degree of pessimism does not affect 
the evaluation of the alternatives, and the decision criterion reduces to subjective expected 
utility.  Let the anchor probability distribution be ) 1 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 8 . 0 ( = f  for religions  
presented in Table 1.    Then, utility representation (2) implies 
) , , ( c b a X =
4 ) ( = a V ,  , and 
, and religion a is chosen.  For case 2, ambiguity is complete and DM resolves 
uncertainty using max-min decision rule because she is a total pessimist.  The utility function (2) 
implies  ,  , and 
7 ) ( − = b V
14 ) ( − = c V
20 ) ( − = a V 10 ) ( − = b V 20 ) ( − = c V , and religion b is chosen. For case 3, 
ambiguity is complete and DM resolves uncertainty using max-max decision rule because she is 
                                                 
6 Note that we slightly abuse our notation by occasionally subsuming the dependence of θ  on the choice of action 
x . 
  11a total optimist.  The utility function (2) implies  10 ) ( = a V ,  20 ) ( = b V , and  , and 
religion c is chosen.   This illustrates how changes in the degree of ambiguity and changes in the 
degree of pessimism can alter religious choice, which we now examine in more detail. 
30 ) ( = c V
 
3.  Interacting Effects of the Degree of Pessimism and the Degree of Ambiguity on Utility 
Having a measure of the degree of ambiguity allows us to examine its effect on utility, 
and more interestingly examine how changes in the degree of ambiguity interact with changes in 
the degree of pessimism.  The marginal effect of the degree of ambiguity on the utility provided 
by a particular action x is given by  




N N u u u f u f u f
x V
θ θ θ θ θ α α θ θ θ
λ
) 1 ( ....
) (




Using (3), the following result is readily obtained. 
Theorem 2 (Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Utility):  For any set of beliefs P  and any action   X x∈ , 







































































x  when  . 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ >
Proof of Theorem 2:  Since  the derivative  0
1 ≥ −
x x u u
N θ θ λ ∂
∂ ) (x V
 in (3) is non-increasing in α .    




N N u f u f u f u
x V
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
λ





2 1 2 1  is non-negative because 
, and 
x x x x
N N u u u u θ θ θ θ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
−1 2 1 ...
λ ∂
∂ ) (x V
 is strictly positive when  .  Analogously, when 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ >




N u f u f u f u
x V
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
λ





2 1 1 2 1  is non-positive because 
, and 
x x x x
N N u u u u θ θ θ θ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
−1 2 1 ...
λ ∂
∂ ) (x V
 is strictly negative when  .  Because 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ >
λ ∂
∂ ) (x V
 is a 
  12continuous and strictly increasing function of α , there must exist a value  ) ( ˆ x α  such 






































































x when  . QED 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ >
For the remainder of the discussion in this section, assume there is some variation in the 
payoffs associated with the actionxso that   and the strict inequality of the theorem 
holds.  In this generic case, Theorem 2 indicates that the qualitative impact of a change in the 
degree of ambiguity depends upon the degree of pessimism. When DM is sufficiently 
pessimistic, the utility of any action decreases as ambiguity increases. Conversely, when DM is 
sufficiently optimistic, the utility of any action increases as the degree of ambiguity increases.   
At the threshold degree of pessimism 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ >
α ˆ  a change in the degree of ambiguity does not affect the 
utility associated with actionx.  This threshold is related to the payoffs and the anchor 














θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
α
−
+ + + −
≡
x x x x
()
.  The implied 
λ α,   isopayoff mapping is presented in Figure 1, and the calculations that prove the mapping 
has this structure are presented in Appendix B.  
Figure 1: Isopayoff Mapping for the Degree of Pessimism α  and Degree of Ambiguity λ  
 










Increases in payoff  
from action x 
) ( ˆ x   αTheorem 2 is an intuitive result. An increase in ambiguity enlarges the set of admissible 
probability distributions  . Some of the added distributions will assign higher probabilities to 
outcomes that are more attractive and some will assign higher probabilities to outcomes that are 
less attractive.   This implies   in the preference functional (1) will increase, while 
 will decrease.  A more optimistic decision maker places more weight on the 
former, whereas the pessimistic decision maker places more weight on the latter.   Thus, an 
increase in ambiguity will increase utility when the optimist is optimistic enough, while it will 























P p u p θ
θ
θ min
  To apply Theorem 2 to our theory of religious choice, consider religion a in Table 1.  The 







{} () { } () { } ( ) 4 ) 20 )( 1 . 0 ( ) 20 )( 1 . 0 ( ) 10 )( 8 . 0 ( ....




N u f u f u f θ θ θ θ θ θ .  
This implies  [] [ ] 20 . 0 20 10 / 4 10 ) ( ˆ = − − − = a α .  For religions b and c,  90 . 0 ) ( ˆ = b α  
and 88 . 0 ) ( ˆ = c α .    Thus, Theorem 2 indicates DM must be quite optimistic ( 20 . 0 < α ) in order 
for an increase in ambiguity to increase the utility associated with religion a, while DM can be 
rather pessimistic (e.g., 87 . 0 = α ) and an increase in ambiguity will increase the utilities 
associated with religions b and c.  With a moderate degree of pessimism (e.g., 87 . 0 21 . 0 < <α ), 
an increase in ambiguity will decrease the utility associated with religion a while increasing the 
utilities associated with religions b and c.  This illustrates the finding that, because the marginal 
impact of a change in the degree of ambiguity varies across the religions, a change in ambiguity 
can change DM’s religious choice. 
 
  144. The Anchor Choice, Max-min Choice, and Max-max Choice 
To make our notation more compact we re-write (2) in the form  
(4)  V(x;λ,α) = 1− λ () A(x)+ λB(x,α), 
where  A(x)≡ f θ1 x () {} () uθ1 x ()
x + f θ2 x ( ) {} () uθ2 x ()
x +....+ f θN x ( ) { } ( )uθN x ()
x  and 
B(x,α) ≡ uθ N x ()
x −α(uθ N x ()
x − uθ1 x ()
x ).   Now, fix the degree of pessimism at an arbitrary level 
α ∈ 0,1 []  and consider two actions x and y. If  A(x) ≥ A(y) and B(x,α) ≥ B(y,α), then action x is 
preferred to y irrespective of the degree of ambiguity.   If  and  ) ( ) ( y A x A > B(x,α) < B(y,α), then 
action x is preferred to y if and only if DM has sufficiently unambiguous beliefs. In general, DM 
will choose the action for which A is highest when beliefs are sufficiently unambiguous, while 
the action for which B is highest will be chosen when beliefs are sufficiently ambiguous. When 
the degree of ambiguity is high, the degree of pessimism points DM either toward the optimistic 
choice argmax
x
uθ N x ()
x { } or toward the pessimistic choice argmax uθ1 x ()
x { }.   These observations are 
summarized more carefully in the following theorem. 
Theorem 3: (Anchor, max-max, max-min)    Given any set of beliefs P ,  
 
(i.)  For any degree of pessimismα ∈ 0,1 [ ], there exists a degree of ambiguity () α λ  such that 
DM prefers action argmaxA(x)
x
 whenever λ < λ; 
(ii.)  For any degree of pessimism α ∈ 0,1 [ ],  there exists a degree of ambiguity λ α ()  such 
that DM prefers action argmaxB(x,α)
x
 whenever λ > λ α ( ); 
(iii.)  There exist  L α  and λL such that DM prefers action argmax
x
uθ N x ()
x { } whenever  L α α ≤  
and λ > λL;  
(iv.)  There exist  H α  and λH such that DM prefers action argmax
x
uθ1 x ()
x { }  whenever  H α α ≥  
andλ > λH. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3: Part (i) follows from the continuity of the payoff function V(x;λ,α)  in λ  




. Part (ii) follows from the 
continuity of the payoff function V(x;λ,α)  in λ  for each action x and the fact that 




. Part (iii) follows from the continuity of the payoff 
function V(x;λ,α)  in  λ,α ()   for each action x and the fact that 
argmax
x
Vx ;λ =1,α = 0 () = argmax
x
uθ N x ()
x { } . Part (iv) follows from the continuity of the payoff 
function V(x;λ,α)  in  λ,α ()   for each action x and the fact that 
argmax
x
Vx ;λ =1,α =1 () = argmax
x
uθ1 x ()
x { } . QED 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the implications of Theorem 3.  When there is total ambiguity ( 1 = λ ), 




x { } , and this choice is also best if DM becomes increasingly pessimistic.   
When the decision maker is entirely pessimistic, the max-min action is best under total 
ambiguity and under less than total ambiguity down to some threshold level  L λ . By analogous 
reasoning, there are thresholds  H α  and  H λ  that are associated with DM choosing the optimistic 




N uθ max arg .  The tradeoffs between the level of pessimism and level of 
ambiguity derived in Theorem 2 indicate there are sets of  ) , ( α λ  combinations that support the 
max-min and max-max choices, as shown in Figure 2.   Finally, as the level of ambiguity 
decreases to zero, Theorem 3 indicates there must be a set of  ) , ( α λ  combinations that support 
the anchor choice argmaxA(x)
x
, as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 demonstrates the case where 
three actions are available to the decision maker, one of these actions is the anchor choice, the 
second action is the max-min choice, while the third action is the max-max choice. The 




  16Figure 2:  Three Special Alternative Choices 















  To illustrate Theorem 3 for religious choice, reconsider the religious payoff parameter 
values in Table 1.  When  0 = λ ,  4 ) ( ) , 0 ; ( = = a A a V α ,  7 ) ( ) , 0 ; ( − = = b A b V α , and 
14 ) ( ) , 0 ; ( − = = c A c V α .  The optimal choice is the anchor choice, religion a.  When there is no 
ambiguity, the degree of pessimism does not affect the religious choice.  However, consider now 
a low degree of pessimism ( 1 . = α ) and increase the degree of ambiguity.  When we hit the 
ambiguity level  51 . = λ , we find  53 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = a V ,  24 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = b V , and  89 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = c V , 
so the optimal choice switches from religion a to the max-max choice, religion c.  The optimal 
choice remains religion c for the degree of ambiguity in the range  ( ] 1 , 50 . = λ .  When the degree 
of pessimism is high ( 9 . = α ) and we increase the degree of ambiguity, when we hit the 
ambiguity level  53 . = λ , we find  13 . 7 ) 9 ,. 53 ;. ( − = a V ,  00 . 7 ) 9 ,. 53 ;. ( − = b V , and 
, so the optimal choice switches from religion a to the max-min choice, 
religion b.  The optimal choice remains religion b for the degree of ambiguity in the range 
53 . 14 ) 9 ,. 53 ;. ( − = c V
( ] 1 , 52 . = λ .   
  17Under complete ambiguity, the preference functional (4) becomes  ) , ( ) , 1 ; ( α α x B x V =  .  
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1 1 θ θ > ) , ( ) , ( α α y B x B >  for all  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ α .    Actionx provides a higher payoff than 
action   in the most optimistic state and in the most pessimistic state.  Thus, action  will not 
be chosen over action 
y y
x under complete ambiguity, no matter what the degree of pessimism.  
This observation suggests the following definition.  
 
Definition 1 (Irrelevance under complete ambiguity):  An action  is “irrelevant under complete 
ambiguity” if there is some other action 
y









1 1 θ θ >
 
Irrelevance is important because it reduces the number of meaningful alternatives when it 
applies.   In particular, for religious choice, the irrelevance of many conceivable religions offers 
an explanation for why a given decision maker may not perceive too many relevant religions in a 
decision matrix.  It is possible that one particular action makes all other actions irrelevant under 
complete ambiguity.  In this special case, a move toward complete ambiguity motivates DM to 
select one particular choice, no matter what DM’s degree of pessimism.   This special case is 
described by the following definition.    
 
Definition 2 (Dominance under complete ambiguity):  An actionx is “dominant under complete 









1 1 θ θ > X y∈ ,  x y ≠ . 
 
  18The concepts of irrelevance and dominance under complete ambiguity have implications 
for evangelism.  If the beliefs of decision makers are completely ambiguous, then one religion 
will make others irrelevant by instilling the perception that the religion offers a high reward for 
adoption when it is true, and high penalty of non-adoption.  For example, suppose the decision 
matrix for DM changes from what is presented in Table 1 to what is presented in Table 2.  As 
before, religion c offers the highest reward for adoption when it is true: 
.  However, now religion c also imposes the largest penalty 
for non-adoption when true:  .   It follows that religion c is 
dominant under complete ambiguity, making both religions a and b irrelevant.      






c N N N u u u θ θ θ
() () () 30 30 20






c u u u θ θ θ
Table 2:  Dominance Under Complete Ambiguity 
  Religion a True  Religion b True  Religion c True 
Religion a  10  -20  -30 
Religion b  -10  20  -30 
Religion c  -10  -20  30 
 
When  1 < λ  DM’s choice is affected by the difference between the payoffs for the most 
preferred and the least preferred states of nature,  .  This is because the marginal effect of 
the degree of pessimism on the attractiveness of action 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ −
x is  ( ) 0
1 < − −
x x u u
N θ θ λ , obtained by 
differentiating (2) with respect to α .  Greater pessimism reduces the anticipated payoff 
associated with any action x, as would be expected. More interestingly, we see this marginal 
impact depends upon both the degree of ambiguity λ and the payoff difference  .  For a 
given level of ambiguity 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ −
λ ,  greater pessimism reduces utility more when the payoff difference 
  19x x u u
N 1 θ θ −  is larger. And, for a given payoff difference  , greater pessimism reduces utility 
more when the degree of ambiguity 
x x u u
N 1 θ θ −
λ  is greater. This reasoning underlies the following result.    
 
Theorem 4 (Smallest and Largest Differential Payoffs and the Degree of Pessimism):  If 
for all actions  uθ N x ()
x − uθ1 x ()
x ≤ uθ N ′  x  ()
′  x  − uθ1 ′  x  ()
′  x  ′  x  that are alternatives to action x, and DM prefers 
action x to all alternative actions  ′  x  with degree of pessimism α and beliefs P , then DM must 
prefer action x to all alternative actions  ′  x  with higher degree of pessimism  α α > and beliefs 
P .   Conversely, if uθ N x ()
x − uθ1 x ()
x ≥ uθ N ′  x  ()
′  x  − uθ1 ′  x  ()
′  x  for all actions  ′  x  that are alternatives to action x, 
and DM prefers action x to all alternative actions  ′  x  with degree of pessimism α and beliefs  , 
then DM must prefer action 
P
x to all alternative actions  ′  x  with degree of pessimism  α α < and 
beliefs P .    
 
Proof of Theorem 4: We need only prove the first part, for the proof for the second part is 














′ − ≤ − θ θ θ θ x′.  Applying Theorem 1, we can 
write   
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Let  ) , ( ) , ( ) , , ( α α α x V x V x x W ′ − ≡ ′ . By our supposition,  
(i)   0 ) , , ( ≥ ′ α x x W  for all  .   x′
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x x W
N N θ θ θ θ λ
α
α
 for allα  and all .    x′
It follows from (i) and (ii) that  0 ) , , ( ≥ ′ α x x W  for all x′ and all α  such that  1 ≤ ≤α α .  That is, 
any decision maker with degree of pessimism  α α >  must also prefer religion x. QED. 
 
Theorem 4 indicates that optimists are more likely than pessimists to find appeal in a 
choice with a large difference between the largest possible payoff and the lowest.  If such a 
  20choice is appealing, it will tend to capture the most optimistic decision makers.  Conversely, 
pessimists will tend to find more appeal in a choice where this difference is small.  If a choice 
with such a small difference in the possible payoffs is attractive, Theorem 4 indicates it will be 
the most pessimistic decision makers who will find it attractive.   
To illustrate Theorem 4 for religious choice, when the level of the ambiguity for the 
decision maker with the Table 1 payoff structure is    50 . = λ , we find  , 
, and 
35 . 5 ) 11 ,. 50 ;. ( = a V
85 . 4 ) 11 ,. 50 ;. ( = b V 25 . 5 ) 11 ,. 50 ;. ( = c V , so the optimal choice is religion a.  Religion a has 
the smallest payoff difference, with  .  Theorem 4 indicates that 
religion a would be the optimal choice for any higher degree of pessimism 
() () 30 20 10 ) (






] 1 , 11 (. ∈ α , which 
trial calculations can confirm.  When the level of the ambiguity is 51 . = λ , we find 
,  , and  53 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = a V 24 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = b V 89 . 5 ) 1 ,. 51 ;. ( = c V , so the optimal choice is religion c.  
Religion c has the largest payoff difference, with    () () ( ) 50 20 30 ) (





N θ θ .  Theorem 4 
indicates that religion c would be the optimal choice for any lower degree of pessimism 
) 10 ,. 0 [ ∈ α , which trial calculations can confirm. 
 
5. Discussion 
  John von Neumann and Blaise Pascal lived in different centuries, but are connected in a 
number of ways.  Both were great mathematicians, Pascal in 17
th century, von Neumann in the 
20
th.  Both made significant contributions to decision theory, Pascal with his wager and work on 
probability, von Neumann with his minimax theorem of 1928 and his Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior with Oscar Morgenstern (Morgenstern and von Neumann, 1944[2000]).    
Both died relatively young, Pascal at 39, von Neuman at 54.    A final interesting connection is 
Pascal’s application of decision theory to religion may have influenced the religious choice of 
  21von Neuman.   In the summer of 1955, von Neumann was diagnosed with advanced, incurable 
cancer.    By the time the disease had confined him to bed, von Neumann had converted to 
Catholicism.   About this conversion, Jorden (1994a, p.1) comments, “As might be expected of 
the inventor of the minimax principle, von Neumann was reported to have said, perhaps in part 
jovially, that Pascal had a point: If there is a chance that God exists, and that damnation is the lot 
of the unbeliever, then it is reasonable to believe.”  
  Applying our version of the  MMEU − α model, a model in the decision theoretic 
tradition of Pascal and von Neumann, we have developed a relatively general theory of religious 
choice.  In doing so, we have addressed the concern of Iannaccone (1998, 1491) who notes that 
“the problem of religious uncertainty has received little attention and scarcely any formal 
analysis.”   The theory of religious choice embedded in our model is one that recognizes 
uncertainty in the form of ambiguity, not just risk.  This is significant in that, in the extreme case 
of pure risk (i.e., no ambiguity), the decision maker’s degree of pessimism has no impact on 
choice.  In the general case, the degree of ambiguity interacts with the decision maker’s degree 
of pessimism, so a change in one may or may not alter the religion chosen, depending upon the 
level of the other.            
A recent Wikipedia entry reports that Christianity and Islam are the two largest religions 
in the world, with 2.1 billion and 1.5 billion followers, respectively (Wikipedia, 2008).     By 
comparison, the number of Atheists is small, included among the 1.1 billion classified in the 
catch all category atheist/anti-theistic/anti-religious/secular/agnostic.    How might our theory 
offer an explanation for these numbers? 
Suppose the typical decision maker perceives Atheism, Christianity, and Islam as 
religious alternatives.  Simplistically speaking, Christianity and Islam each offer a heavenly 
  22afterlife for adopting the true religion, and each offer a hellish afterlife for not adopting the true 
religion.  Assume this leads the decision maker to associate the lowest maximum payoff and 
lowest minimum payoff with Atheism.  Under complete ambiguity, this implies Atheism will 
neither be the max-max choice of the extreme optimist, nor the max-min choice of the extreme 
pessimist.  Thus, significant ambiguity is one possible explanation for the small number of 
Atheists compared to the number of adherents to Christianity and Islam.    
The utilized model indicates that the saliency of religious reward concepts like heaven 
and religious punishment concepts like hell tends to be augmented by increased ambiguity. 
Under complete ambiguity, the perception of heaven for correct adoption attracts optimists, 
while the perception of hell for incorrect non-adoption attracts pessimists. Thus, a move toward 
ambiguity tends to prompt a decision maker away from Atheism, either toward Christianity or 
Islam. To adopt Atheism, a move away from complete ambiguity must be made, but such a 
move is not sufficient. The decision maker must also have an anchor probability distribution that 
places little probability weight on the truth of either Christianity or Islam, but much weight on 
the truth of Atheism.      
The studied parameterization of the  MMEU − α model can be applied to more than 
religious choice.  The model is especially suited to situations where one might expect an 
interaction between the degree of ambiguity and degree of pessimism.    Also, it is interesting to 
note that, if we think of the decision under uncertainty as that being made by an agent in a 
principle-agent problem, the principle may be able to control the behavior of the agent more 
effectively by taking action that will increase the degree of ambiguity in the agent’s mind.    This 
counter-intuitive result arises from the fact that a move toward ambiguity increases the saliency 
  23of the highest and lowest possible outcomes associated with a decision alternative, which the 
principle may also be able to control. 
Lastly, we note that our theory of religious choice does not help us determine whether 
God actually exists, nor help us determine whether any particular religion is true.  First of all, the 
choice may not be ours, but God may be the one doing the choosing, and we just think we have a 
choice.
7  Second, if we can choose independently, our theory cannot tell us whether we are 
choosing a God of our creation, or choosing a God that has created us.  Our theory is consistent 
with the idea that people create God and religion, with the attractiveness of a given religion 
dependent upon the extent to which it recognizes how people make choices under varying 
degrees of ambiguity.   However, it is also consistent with the existence of a God who values 
faith, and created people who can express it as they make religious choices while facing the 
ambiguity associated with death.     
                                                 
7 The Calvinist perspective in Christian theology, for example, is that God must first choose to provide grace to you 
before you can choose God.  This is in contrast to doctrines of “free will” that postulate free agency, so that you can 
independently choose God or not.     
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  26Appendix A 
Let Θ denote a finite state space {1,...,N} and let Σ denote the σ-algebra of all subsets of Θ; i.e., 
Σ = 2
Θ.  Let Δ denote the set of all additive probability measures over Σ.   A capacity is a non-
additive set function v: Σ → [0,1] such that (i) v(∅) = 0, (ii) v(Σ) = 1, and (iii) v(X) ≤ v(Y) for all 
X, Y⊆Σ and X  Y. The core of the capacity v is the closed, convex, and bounded set 
C(v)={p∈Δ: p(X) ≥ v(X), ∀X∈Σ}.  C(v) is by construction polyhedral.   The capacity, v, is 
supermodular (convex) if v(X ∪Y) + v(X ∩ Y) ≥ v(X) + v(Y) for all X, Y⊆Σ.  When v is 
supermodular C(v) is non-empty, v is balanced, and v(X) = min {p(X): p
⊆
∈C(v)} for all X∈Σ. 
 
Appendix B:  Isopayoff Curve Analysis 
Define  {} () { } () { } ( ) {} { } ) ( .... ) 1 (
1 2 1 2 1
x x x x
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x x u u u u f u f u f V
N N N θ θ θ θ θ θ α λ θ θ θ λ − − + + + + − ≡  where 
0 ≤α,λ ≤1, and consider the set of pairs ( ) λ α,  such that the decision-maker’s payoff from 
action x yield the same payoff, given by 
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N N N θ θ θ θ θ θ α λ θ θ θ λ − − + + + + − =  Using these two 
representations of V  to solve for λ  in terms of α , we obtain: 
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The first and second order derivatives of  ( ) α λ  are given by: 
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  27The slope and curvature of the isopayoff curve ( ) α λ  depends on the relationship between 
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cases: 
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 over the admissible range of 
parameters. The isopayoff curve for Case 1 is graphed in Figure B1. 
Case 2:  {} () { } () { } ( ) {} { } ) ( ....
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 over the admissible range of parameters (see Figure B2). 
Case 3:  {} () { } () { } ( ) {} { } ) ( ....
1 2 1 2 1
x x x x
N
x x u u u u f u f u f
N N N θ θ θ θ θ θ α θ θ θ − − = + + +  
The isopayoff curve for Case 3 is the vertical line graphed in Figure B3.   
We can graph the three different types of indifference curves for the three possible cases 
in one figure, which is done in Figure 1 in the text in the discussion after Theorem 2. 
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  29Using isopayoff curves to compare actions x and x′: 
Consider two actions x and   and an arbitrary  x′ ( ) λ α, . Suppose that action x yields a higher 
payoff than action   when degree of pessimism and degree of ambiguity are given by  x′ ( ) λ α, . 
That is, we assume that  ) , ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) 1 ( α λ λ α λ λ x B x A x B x A ′ + ′ − ≥ + − .  For the case of 
parameters depicted n Figure B4, shaded area represents the set of  α,λ ( ) such that x yields a 
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